Why right-wing populism and authoritarian politics are gaining ground again

Liberal democracies were long regarded as the successful alternative to fascism, Nazism, and communist dictatorships. By the end of the Cold War, at the latest, the direction seemed clear: more democracy, more freedom, and more international cooperation.

But this self-image has become fragile. Right-wing populist parties are gaining support, democratic institutions are under open attack, and the promise of strong leadership no longer appears to some people as a threat, but rather as a solution.

Authoritarian politics is not regaining appeal because large segments of the population suddenly reject democracy on principle. It gains support where democratic institutions are perceived as slow, powerless, or far removed from everyday life. Economic uncertainty, loss of status and control, cultural conflicts, mistrust, and political polarization reinforce one another. Authoritarian movements offer simple answers to these issues, clear culprits, and the promise of order and the ability to take action.

A recent snapshot from Germany illustrates just how evident this shift has become. In the federal election on February 23, 2025, the CDU/CSU received 28.5 percent of the second votes, while the AfD received 20.8 percent (Federal Returning Officer, 2025). In the ARD DeutschlandTrend survey of August 6, 2026, the results of the “Sunday poll” were reversed: The Union reached 21 percent, while the AfD reached 28 percent—its highest result to date in this survey (ARD-DeutschlandTrend, 2026).

International comparative data also point to a decline in democracy. According to the V-Dem Democracy Report 2026, nearly a quarter of the world’s countries were undergoing a process of autocratization in 2025. Freedom House reported that 2025 marked the twentieth consecutive year of a global decline in political rights and civil liberties (Nord et al., V-Dem Democracy Report, 2026; Gorokhovskaia et al., Freedom in the World, 2026).

How did this happen?

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Why simple answers are appealing

Democracy thrives on balancing differing interests. Decisions take time, compromises are necessary, and the results rarely satisfy everyone involved.

Especially in times of crisis, this system can seem slow, contradictory, and ineffective. Authoritarian politicians, on the other hand, promise clarity. They present simple solutions to complex problems, point the finger at those to blame, and give the impression that they can act decisively.

This can become appealing when people feel that, while democratic institutions engage in lengthy debate, they fail to solve key problems. The desire for strong leadership does not necessarily stem from a fundamental rejection of democracy. Often, it begins with the hope for more order and the ability to take action.

The danger lies in the fact that democratic checks and balances can quickly come to be seen as disruptive obstacles: courts delay decisions, parliaments debate for too long, the media ask uncomfortable questions, and the opposition blocks political initiatives. What is actually intended to limit power is portrayed as a sign of weakness (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018).

Loss of control, uncertainty, and loss of status

Many people view the past decades as a period of profound change. Globalization, digitalization, migration, climate change, artificial intelligence, and geopolitical crises are transforming the economy and society at a rapid pace.

Objectively speaking, one’s own life may not even have gotten worse. Politically, the mere feeling of losing control over the future is often enough to make a difference.

Those who believe they are falling behind economically, no longer understand social changes, or see the familiar order under threat become more receptive to political proposals that promise security, isolation, and national self-determination.

This is not just about absolute poverty. The fear of social decline and comparisons with others also play an important role. People may perceive their situation as unfair if they believe they receive less recognition than other groups or are losing status compared to previous generations.

Studies suggest that economic and cultural explanations cannot be clearly distinguished from one another. Economic change can be experienced as a material loss, but also as a loss of recognition, social status, and cultural security (Gidron & Hall, British Journal of Sociology, 2017).

Right-wing populist movements capitalize on such experiences. They often link economic concerns to cultural or national conflicts and blame elites, international institutions, or social minorities.

However, economic insecurity does not automatically lead to authoritarian attitudes. It also depends on how political parties explain changes, which conflicts they highlight, and what solutions they offer.

Trust, representation, and established parties

Democratic systems depend on citizens trusting their institutions, at least in principle. This level of trust varies significantly across countries, institutions, and demographic groups. It is often particularly low among people who believe they have no influence over political decisions.

The 2024 OECD Trust Survey reveals a clear correlation between the sense of political participation and trust in the national government. Among respondents who felt they had influence over government actions, 69 percent trusted the national government. Among those who did not perceive such influence, the figure was only 22 percent (OECD, 2024).

To many people, however, politics seems far removed from their everyday lives. Government agencies are perceived as slow, political decisions as difficult to understand, and political parties as indistinguishable from one another. Scandals, broken promises, and contradictory crisis communications can reinforce this impression.

At the same time, traditional mainstream parties in many countries have lost some of their former appeal. They barely reach certain social groups anymore, and in their language, personnel, and priorities, they sometimes seem far removed from those groups’ everyday lives.

When people feel that their own vote won’t make a difference anyway, politicians who present themselves as opponents of the entire system become attractive. They don’t have to convincingly prove that they can solve problems better. Often, it is enough for them to credibly embody anger, disappointment, and rejection.

Their limited political experience can even become an advantage in a climate of mistrust. Those who have not previously held positions of responsibility can more easily claim that they are not part of the problem.

Identity, cultural change, and nationalism

Political conflicts are no longer just about wages, taxes, or social benefits. They are increasingly centered on migration, religion, gender roles, language, social recognition, and cultural values.

For some people, these changes mean greater freedom and equality. Others experience them as a loss of orientation, status, or cultural security.

An influential explanation for the success of authoritarian populism is therefore the theory of “cultural backlash.” It describes a backlash against social liberalization and the transformation of traditional norms. However, the significance of this mechanism is controversial in research and should not be understood as the sole explanation (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Berman, Annual Review of Political Science, 2021).

In this situation, nationalist movements offer a seemingly simple model of social order. They promise a sense of belonging, a shared identity, and a clear boundary between “us” and “them.”

Nationalism is not automatically undemocratic. A nation can also be understood as a political community bound by shared democratic rules and equal civil rights. Nationalism becomes problematic when belonging is defined primarily by origin, religion, ethnic descent, or cultural conformity. In such cases, certain segments of the population are no longer regarded as equal members of the political community (Mylonas & Tudor, Annual Review of Political Science, 2021).

Social media: an amplifier, but not the sole cause

Social media has fundamentally transformed political communication.

Content competes for attention on these platforms. Outrage, fear, and moral indignation often generate a particularly high number of reactions. Likes, comments, and shares can contribute to users repeating similar messages and platforms showing them comparable content more frequently.

Studies on Twitter showed that positive social feedback on outraged posts increased the likelihood of further expressions of outrage. Users also adapted their language to the norms of their respective social networks (Brady et al., Science Advances, 2021).

Simplified and emotionally charged messages thus often spread more easily than nuanced explanations. Political opponents quickly come to be seen not as people with different interests, but as enemies, traitors, or threats.

Research, however, challenges the simplistic claim that social media or its algorithms are solely responsible for political polarization. In a large-scale Facebook experiment, the visibility of politically aligned sources was reduced by about one-third. This did not result in any measurable change in the participants’ political attitudes or affective polarization (Nyhan et al., Nature, 2023).

In contrast, a recent field study on X concluded that the targeted upvoting or downvoting of posts containing anti-democratic statements and partisan hostility can influence attitudes toward the opposing political camp. The measured effects were present but limited and related to a specific intervention in a specific usage context (Piccardi et al., Science, 2025).

The results are not necessarily contradictory. Rather, they show that it depends on what content is altered, how an algorithm intervenes, which platform is being studied, and how long an intervention lasts.

Social media should therefore be understood primarily as amplifiers and distribution infrastructures. They can make existing conflicts more visible, accelerate their spread, and facilitate the normalization of conspiracy narratives or misanthropic statements. However, they are not the sole cause of social polarization.

Polarization changes the standards

In highly polarized societies, the focus is increasingly shifting away from which policies make objective sense. What becomes decisive is which side wins.

Political opponents are no longer viewed as legitimate rivals, but as an existential threat. This can lead to a growing willingness to undermine democratic rules, as long as it benefits one’s own side.

An experiment in the U.S. showed that voters often punished violations of democratic principles only to a limited extent if the candidate in question aligned with their own political orientation. The greater the political distance from the opposing side, the less willing voters were to vote for a candidate from the other camp due to a violation of democratic principles (Graham & Svolik, American Political Science Review, 2020).

People may then accept attacks on the courts, the media, or electoral procedures because they believe this is the only way to stop an even more dangerous opponent.

Authoritarian politics, therefore, does not always arise from an openly expressed rejection of democracy. It can also grow out of the conviction that democratic rules must be temporarily set aside in the face of a supposed exceptional situation.

Distinguishing between populism, nationalism, authoritarianism, and fascism

These terms are often conflated in public debates, but they describe different phenomena.

Populism pits a supposedly unified and morally good people against corrupt or self-serving elites. Its frequently anti-pluralist core is particularly problematic: Populists not only claim to represent the people, but sometimes assert that they alone embody the true will of the people (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017).

Nationalism declares the nation to be the most important political point of reference. It can be democratic and civic in orientation, but it can also take on an ethnic, exclusionary, or aggressive character.

Authoritarianism favors concentrated political power and strong leadership. Democratic checks and balances, political competition, and individual freedoms are thereby restricted or viewed as obstacles.

Fascism continues. It combines radical nationalism with an authoritarian leadership model, a rejection of pluralistic democracy, and the idea of a national rebirth. Historically, it has also included mass political mobilization, the glorification of violence, and the systematic exclusion of certain groups (Paxton, 2004).

Not every populist is a fascist, and not every nationalist rejects democracy. Nor are conservative or anti-immigration positions automatically authoritarian.

Nevertheless, the lines between them can be blurred. Populist rhetoric can delegitimize democratic institutions. Exclusionary nationalism can justify unequal civil rights. Authoritarian governments can gradually restrict the space for opposition, the media, and civil society.

This is precisely why it is important to use these terms precisely. Those who label every right-wing position as fascist blur the distinctions and make it harder to identify genuinely fascist characteristics.

Democracies often erode gradually

In established democracies today, the transition to an authoritarian system often does not occur through a sudden coup d’état.

Governments are initially legitimized through largely free elections. Afterward, they gradually change the political rules of the game. Independent courts are weakened, critical media are pressured, state institutions are filled with partisan appointees, and the rights of minorities are curtailed.

Elections may still take place. However, they become increasingly unfair because the government and the opposition no longer compete under the same conditions.

Political scientist Nancy Bermeo describes this process as “executive aggrandizement”: elected governments gradually expand their power and weaken the institutions meant to keep them in check (Bermeo, Journal of Democracy, 2016).

It is precisely this creeping process that makes democratic regression difficult to detect. Each individual measure may seem limited or technically justified. Only when taken together do these interventions fundamentally alter the political system.

This does not mean that coups d’état and overt violence have disappeared. Military coups, armed conflicts, attacks on democratic institutions, and direct repression remain major causes of the loss of political freedom worldwide (Gorokhovskaia et al., Freedom in the World, 2026).

What democracies can do about it

Moral outrage alone will not stop authoritarian movements. A blanket dismissal of their voters is no substitute for a political response and can further deepen existing alienation. However, this does not mean that anti-democratic statements or attacks on minorities should be downplayed.

Democracies must demonstrate that they are capable of taking action. This includes functioning administrations, reliable public infrastructure, social security, and political decisions whose goals and consequences are explained in a transparent manner.

People also need real opportunities to exert influence and be heard. Participatory processes must not be merely symbolic. Political feedback must be visibly incorporated into decisions. The strong correlation between perceived participation and institutional trust demonstrates how important political effectiveness is for the stability of a democracy ([OECD, 2024] (https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results_9a20554b-en.html)).

Equally important are independent courts, a free press, transparent government agencies, political education, and an active civil society.

Democratic principles must be defended even when one’s own political camp might benefit in the short term from their weakening. This includes the willingness to accept electoral defeats, to recognize the opposition as legitimate, and to allow for a peaceful transfer of power.

Democracy thrives not only on elections. It thrives on the limitation of political power and the protection of those who do not belong to the prevailing majority.

Conclusion

Authoritarian and nationalist ideas do not suddenly become appealing again simply because Western societies have completely forgotten their history.

Their appeal grows when several developments converge: economic uncertainty, loss of status and control, social change, lack of trust, cultural conflicts, digital amplification, and political polarization.

Authoritarian movements offer simple answers to real fears. They promise order, a sense of belonging, and the ability to take action. These promises become particularly appealing where democratic politics seem complicated and problems remain visibly unresolved.

This development is not inevitable. Democracies can regain trust if they effectively solve problems, enable social participation, and credibly defend their own rules.

Democracy is slow, contradictory, and sometimes frustrating. It is precisely this that forces different interests to find common ground and limits political power. This is not its weakness, but its decisive strength.